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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
INGA-LILL ELTON, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
vs. 
BANKERS LIFE & 
CASUALTY COMPANY, 
Defendant and Appell,ant. 
Case No. 
12993 
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
In Points I and III of her Brief, the plaintiff 
and respondent cites certain cases which she con-
tends support her assertion that she sustained the 
burden of proving that Leonard Elton died as a re-
sult of an accident as that term is defined within the 
policy of insurance in question. We do not agree, and 
in this reply will attempt to demonstrate why those 
cases do not support the respondent's position in this 
case. 
REPLY TO POINT I 
OF RESPONDENT'S BRIEF 
Respondent cites and relies on two previous 
Utah Supreme Court decisions as controlling in the 
present case. The first case is Thompson v. American 
Casualty Company, 20 Utah 2d 418, 439 P.2d 276 
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( 1968), in which the insured suffered a disabling 
stroke after a week of hard physical labor. He tried 
to collect on his group accident insurance policy but, 
based on depositions and affidavits, the trial court 
found for defendant as a matter of law. The record 
showed that the plaintiff had suffered ( 1) a brain 
injury 28 years before, which required surgery, (2) 
arteriosclerotic cerebral vascular disease and ( 3) 
pulmonary emphysema. This court reviewed its past 
decisions and reaffirmed its adherence to the test of 
"unexpectedness". The decision in the Thompson case 
merely means that the mere existence of arterioscler-
osis of an undisclosed extent is not enough to render 
the insured's stroke non-accidental as a matter of 
law. The court should take careful note of the fact 
that the Thompson case dealt with a summary judg-
ment and that no evidence had been put on concern-
ing the extent of the arteriosclerosis. That fact fun-
damentally distinguishes the Thompson case from 
the present case because there is extensive evidence 
of previous strokes. Appellant submits that the trial 
court in Thompson could have granted a directed 
verdict on the ground that Thompson's stroke was 
not accidental if evidence introduced at the trial 
showed that, in light of Thompson's previous medical 
con di ti on, the stroke was the "not unexpected" re-
sult of his work with the jackhammer. Ap:rellant 
submits that a directed verdict in Thompson, after 
the trial, would have been completely consistent with 
the Supreme Court opinion and that, likewise, a di-
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rected verdict in the present case would have been 
completely consistent with Thompsori. The court's 
decision in Tlwmpsori was made at an earlier stage 
in the case when the facts were not completely de-
veloped and, therefore, it is completely distinguish-
~ble from the appellant's request for a directed ver-
dict in the present case. 
The second case relied on by respondent is Eltori 
v. Utah State Retirement Board, 503 P.2d 137 
( 1972), in which Mrs. Elton sought to recover a 
pension under the Judicial Retirement Act. The res-
pondent tries to make this decision applicable in the 
present case by referring to Richards v. Standard 
Accident Insurance Company, 58 Utah 622, 200 P. 
1017 ( 1921), an accident insurance case which look-
ed to a workmen's compensation case for assistance 
in defining the term "accident". Respondent claims 
that this case authorizes her to use a Judicial Retire-
ment Act case as precedent in the present case, which 
construes an insurance policy. 
What the respondent fails to recognize is that 
the purposes of the Workmen's Compensation stat-
utes have been redefined in the 42 years since the 
Richards decision was rendered. In Henrie v. Rocky 
Mountain Packing Corporatiori, 113 Utah 415, 196 
P.2d 487 ( 1948), the father of a minor sought to 
bring a wrongful death action against his son's em-
ployer. A small workmen's compensation payment 
had been made, and the court held that this barred 
the father from suing the employer directly. In the 
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course of its decision, the court discussed the purpose 
of the Workmen's Compensation Acts by saying: 
The in ten ti on of the acts, then, was to secure 
workmen and their dependents (not heirs or 
personal representatives) against becoming 
objects of charity, by making reasonable com-
pensation for calamities incidental to the em-
ployment, and to make human wastage in in-
dustry part of the cost of production." Id. at 
493. (Emphasis in original) 
This social interest in construing the Work-
men's Compensation Laws in favor of recovery is 
also present in the "Utah Judges' Retirement Act" 
and was expressly recognized by the legislature in 
1971 when they enacted Utah Code Ann. § 49-7a-2 
(1971) which said: 
The purpose of this act is to ... enable judges 
to provide for themselves and their dependents 
in case of old age, disability and death. 
It is hereby declared to be the policy of the leg-
islature that this act be l'iberally construed to 
provide maximum benefits and protections. 
(Emphasis added) 
In both the Utah Judges' Retirement Act and the 
Workmen's Compensation Act there is a strong so-
cial policy in favor of recovery. 
On the other hand, an insurance policy is a con-
tract which allows a person to protect himself against 
risks he chooses to protect himself against. Although 
it has long been recognized in Utah that ambiguous 
terms in an insurance contract will be construed in 
favor of the insured, the court will not undertake to 
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rewrite the terms of the contract. Although the in-
sured is entitled to the benefit of his bargain, there 
is no strong social policy in favor of recovery on in-
surance contracts. Therefore, because the decision 
construing the Workmen's Compensation Law and 
the Judges' Retirement Act are influenced by the 
strong social policy in favor of recovery, the defini-
tions of accident they contain should not be applied 
in construing an insurance contract which is not 
burdened with those same social considerations. The 
court did not rely on Judicial Retirement Act or 
Workmen's Compensation cases in defining "acci-
dent" in Thompson, supra, and it should nDt rely on 
them in the present case. 
There is yet another reason why the case of El-
ton v. Utah State Retirement Board, supra, is not 
controlling in this case. In that case the evidence 
showed: 
The evidence at the trial shows that Judge 
Leonard Elton was appointed to the bench of 
the Third Judicial District in 1966. At the 
time he was in good health; there were no in-
dications of physical impairment. He was not 
then and had not for many years been under 
medical care. Id. at 138. 
The evidence in this case discloses that, in fact, Leon-
ard Elton did have a disease at the time he assumed 
the bench in 1966, that of arteriosclerosis, which had 
progressed to the point on February 4, 1954, that 
when Leonard Elton went to see Dr. Robert M. Dal-
rymple it was found that he had suffered a heart at-
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tack which was probably of long standing (R. 316, 
322) and which, like the stroke, had been brought 
about by the progression of arteriosclerosis to the 
point where it had closed the artery leading to the 
heart, and that part of the heart fed by that artery 
had actually died (R. 333). After his death, an 
autopsy confirmed the fact that Leonard Elton did, 
in fact, have a healed infaction of the heart with an 
aneurysm formation, emphysema and congestion of 
his lungs, a healed infarct in the spleen, a healed in-
farct in the kidneys and evidence of an old and recent 
infarct in the brain (R. 427), the last of which ap-
parently brought about his death. 
In Point I of her Brief, respondent attempts to 
make a blanket distinction of the cases discussed in 
Appellant's Brief on the ground that the policies in 
those cases contained an "external and violent" re-
quirement or a "disease exclusion" which are not 
contained in the policy in the present case (Respon-
dent's Brief 19). Appellant does not rely on these 
clauses. It merely submits that Judge Elton did not 
die of an "accidental bodily injury" as required in his 
insurance policy. The Utah Supreme Court recog-
nized the separability of the issue of "accident" from 
the other clauses in the insurance policy when it 
quoted in Thompson, supra, the very cases which res-
pondent attempts to distinguish. In that case the 
court discussed only the issue of "accident" and did 
not discuss the presence or absence of the policy pro-
visions which respondent relies on as distinguishing 
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features. Clearly, since the issue of accident was sep-
arable from the other policy provisions in the Thomp-
son case, it is also separable in the present case. 
The fallacy inherent in the respondent's at-
tempted distinction is vividly pointed up in relation 
to Kellogg v. California Western States Life Insur-
ance Company, 114 Utah 567, 201 P.2d 949 ( 1949), 
in which the plaintiff appealed on two grounds and 
its denial of coverage because of the disease exclu-
sion. These were totally independent grounds for ap-
peal and a decision for defendant on either ground 
would have been sufficient to affirm the trial court's 
decision. The court did, in fact, decide the case on 
the ground that there was no "accident". Respon-
dent's assertion that the case was decided on the 
basis of the disease exclusion is completely untenable 
in light of the fact that the court's decision that there 
was no "accident" disposed of the case. The signifi-
cance of the disease exclusion was not even discussed 
in that case. 
REPLY TO POINT III 
OF RESPONDENT'S BRIEF 
The problem with arguments that the respon-
dent makes about "accident" in the present case is 
that they prove too much. In 1949 this court recog-
nized the danger of an over-broad definition of "ac-
cident" when, in Kellogg, supra, it said: 
If a deceased is in a physical condition which 
has reduced his resistance, it stands to rea-
son that he is not going to withstand an op-
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eration as well as the normal man. If in 
addition to that strain he is susceptibl~ to 
shock, it seems almost conclusive that seri-
ous results may be likely. To speak of his 
death as accidental under such circum-
stances is to say that such death is always 
accidental, as there would be no measure 
for dividing it into two classes of accidental 
and non-accidental. Id. at 953 (Emphasis 
added) 
If the arguments made by the respondent in the 
present case are accepted, all strokes would be acci-
dents. For example, respondent would apparently 
require the prediction of the exact date ( Respon-
dent's Brief 23) or even the exact hour (R. 487) on 
which the stroke will occur before the insured's death 
can be non-accidental. This obviously requires pow-
ers of prediction which exceed the capacities of mod-
ern medical science. Doctors simply cannot predict 
the day or hour on which a person will have a stroke, 
even if they are convinced that that person will suf-
fer a stroke in the near future. 
In the present case, Judge Elton's personal phy-
sician, Dr. Robert Dalrymple, stated that, after his 
examination of the Judge on April 28, 1970, "I knew 
he was in for trouble." (R. 326). Dr. Powell said 
that Judge Elton, before his death, looked like a 
chronically ill gentleman and his gait suggested that 
he might have cerebral vascular disease (R. 473). 
Dr. Powell also stated that "we would have antici-
pated death was imminent and it would have occur-
red from complications of his vascular disease" (R. 
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474). Neither Dr. Null nor Dr. Swift saw Judge 
Elton before his death. The testimony of these two 
doctors, coupled with the uncontested evidence of 
Judge Elton's strokes on January 9, 1969, and April 
20, 1970, and his memory loss on May 5, 1970, clear-
ly demonstrate that the Judge's stroke was "not 
unexpected" and, therefore, not an accident. 
Respectfully submitted, 
HANSON & GARRETT 
DON J. HANSON 
520 Continental Bank Bldg. 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Attorneys for Appellant 
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